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Kari Polanyi Levitt is Emeritus Professor of Economics fromMcGill Univer-
sity in Montreal, Canada. She was born in Vienna in 1923 to the well-known
intellectual Karl Polanyi, and grew up there during the famous years of
Red Vienna. She was educated in England before and during World War II,
obtaining her BSc in Economics and the Farr Medal in Statistics from the
London School of Economics in 1947. Following 10 years of engagement
in trade union research in Toronto, she obtained her MA in Economics from
the University of Toronto in 1959 and an appointment in the Department
of Economics at McGill University in 1961, where her particular teaching
interests were in Techniques of Development Planning and Development
Economics. She has inspired generations of students with the vision she has
continued to advance for six decades.
Kari has been involved in the field of development economics since its
origins, as a student of several of the pioneers of the field and later as
one of its pioneers herself, within the more radical tangents of structuralist
development economics. Her important contributions to the field include
her groundbreaking work with Lloyd Best in the late 1960s on developing
the Plantation Economy paradigm, republished as Essays on the Theory of
Plantation Economy (Best and Polanyi Levitt, 2009) and her seminal book,
Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada (Polanyi Levitt,
1970), which galvanized the political Left in Canada, her adopted country.
She has maintained a continuous relationship with the University of the
West Indies (UWI) since her first contact there in 1960, including collabo-
ration with Alister McIntyre and Lloyd Best. She has also served as Visiting
Professor at UWI on several occasions and was appointed the first George
Beckford Professor of Caribbean Political Economy from 1995 to 1997,
where she compiled The George Beckford Papers (Beckford and Polanyi
Levitt, 2000). A collection of her writings on Caribbean issues was pub-
lished as Reclaiming Development: Independent Thought and Caribbean
Community (2005), and a collection of her writings on her father and on
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contemporary economic development as From the Great Transformation to
the Great Financialization (2013).
Kari is a founding member of the Canadian Association for the Study of
International Development (CASID), which has awarded an annual essay
prize in her honour since 2000. Together with Mel Watkins, she was the
first recipient of the John Kenneth Galbraith Prize from the Progressive
Economics ForumofCanada in 2008 andwas awarded an honorary doctorate
from the University of the West Indies in the same year. She is the Honorary
President of the Karl Polanyi Institute of Political Economy, established in
1988 and based at Concordia University in Montreal. She was also inducted
into the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 2004 as an honorary member.
AF: How did you get into development economics? As a young student
during the war years, were you initially interested in development eco-
nomics?
KPL: No. During the war, the London School of Economics campus was
relocated to Cambridge. All of the senior LSE staff were in London running
the war effort — Lionel Robins, Professor Paich, Professor R.G.D. Allen
— they were not in Cambridge. So we had enemy aliens and colonials as
lecturers. The enemy aliens were people like Hayek and Mannheim, and
Nicky Kaldor of course, Europeans with heavy accents. They had British
passports, but they were not really British, so they were not in the inner
circles of the Establishment running the war. Arthur Lewis was actually
the only colonial. He was the first black person ever to be employed by
London University. So the School was fascinating; it was really wonder-
ful for us as students. We had the freedom of the city of Cambridge: we
could live anywhere we wanted, and we could attend Cambridge University
lectures; I could listen to Joan Robinson, Maurice Dobbs . . . Keynes was
not there — he was in London running the war, so I never heard Keynes
lecture.
Arthur Lewis gave the introductory lectures on economics at LSE. He
drew this graph showing the marginal product of labour and the wage rate.
He showed employment would be increased by reducing the wage rate. I
gathered up all of my courage and decided to talk to him after the lecture.
I said, ‘Sir, excuse me, but I don’t believe that. Before the war, we had 3
million unemployed and they couldn’t get employment at any wage’. So he
asked my name and he said, ‘Miss Polanyi, I assume that you have come
here to study the science of economics. When you have mastered it, you
may return and we will discuss the matter’. [Kari laughs.] You know, he
had quite a high pitched voice, he was quite thin at that time, and he looked
hungry. Later he became quite portly.
In the second year he gave a class that made an important impression on
me. He was obviously writing a textbook and he was giving us the chapters
as he was writing it. It was an economic survey from 1919–39, and that
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is where I first learned about the declining terms of trade of the countries
producing agricultural products, Latin America and the Caribbean. But he
also presented an account of Hitler’s Germany — and of Russia, England,
and the colonies.
But I myself was not at all interested in developing countries, or colonies. I
was going to be a labour economist. I wanted to service the labourmovement.
I worked during two summer vacations in factories and during another
summer we made a famous survey on the nutritional state of the British
working population, for the Ministry of Food. This survey was done over
several years. The result, if nutrition is measured by weight according to
height, was that nutrition improved during the war. I also used to offer my
help to the Labour Research Department, an independent labour research
unit. When I was called up for National Service, I got my first real job,
with the Amalgamated Engineering Unit in the research department, on
recommendation from the Labour Research Department.
When the war was over, I went back to the LSE to finishmy undergraduate
degree. In 1947, I found myself in Canada. Joe [Levitt], my fiance´, had
arranged for me to enrol in the Master’s programme at the University of
Toronto and to be a teaching assistant. I was very disappointed with the
University of Toronto. I found it a dull and depressing place, although I
enjoyed teaching a course on English economic history.
I left the university and presented myself at a factory called Acme Screw
and Gear Company in Toronto. Of course I lied about my qualifications,
never told them I had been to university or anything, and I got a job there. I
was there for a year and thoroughly enjoyed the life. So, okay, I am now in
the labour movement . . . but when colleagues discovered I was ‘wastingmy
time’ in a factory, they offered me employment with the United Electrical
Union Labour Research Department. Later I worked for the Mine, Mills and
Smelter Workers Union, as a journalist. There I had to produce a 16-page
tabloid every month. I enjoyed the work. Eventually I decided I would enrol
in graduate studies at the University of Toronto and that is when I became
interested in development economics.
AF: How did you become interested?
KPL: The first time I came across that literature was in the 1950s. Because
I had a strong mathematics background, I became interested in making
input-output tables for inter-industry modelling. Professor Keirstead at the
University of Toronto came from the Maritimes [in Canada] and had con-
nections with Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, and he got me jobs
in the summer working for them. I did one study for them on migration.
Then I got interested in doing work for them on regional economic plan-
ning, for the so-called underdeveloped provinces of Canada, the maritime
region — regional underdevelopment. That got me interested in starting to
do regional input-output tables and I developed that when I came to McGill
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[inMontreal]. So, I came to development economics also throughmy interest
in planning and applying that to regional economic underdevelopment.
AF: Was that around the time that you first started going to Jamaica?
KPL: I started at McGill in 1961, right after Jamaica. Professor Keirstead
was a friend of Arthur Lewis. He spent a sabbatical in Jamaica with his wife
and undertook to do some studies for what was then the Federal Government
of the West Indies. So he sent for a student, which ended up being me. I
arrived in Jamaica in 1960. I arrived right in the middle of the Federal
Government of the West Indies: it started in 1958 and collapsed in 1962.
Alistair McIntyre was teaching in Jamaica at that time. The campus of the
University of West Indies [UWI] was dominated by expatriate British. In
economics, Alistair McIntyre was one of the few West Indians and Lloyd
Best had just been hired, as a junior fellow, at the Institute of Social Economic
Research. He was supposed to be making estimates of national income for
the small islands, but that did not match his interests, and being Mr Best, he
decided he would follow his interests. I do not blame him, but his interest
was in West Indian history.
AF: So then you started working with him around that time?
KPL: Well, that is when I met him . . . but I was interested in planning
techniques. I knew more about techniques than about the substance, of
course. So we thought we would do something together. He had gone to
Guyana and then, when he came back in 1964, we started what became the
Plantation Model.
At McGill, I couldn’t teach development because another professor was
teaching that, so I taught a course in planning techniques. I managed to
supply Statistics Canada with quite a few students. McIntyre, in particular,
kept sending me students, to supervise their graduate work at McGill.
AF: You were also writing Silent Surrender during that time?
KPL: I was approached by Charles Taylor,1 who was a colleague, to write
a position paper for the NDP [New Democratic Party]2 on the issue of
foreign ownership. We are talking about the early 1960s. Charles Taylor
was a possible candidate for the leadership of the NDP and his candidature
was being pushed by David Lewis, who was the leader of the party. (David
Lewis was the father of Stephen Lewis and grandfather of Avy Lewis, who is
married to Naomi Klein.) That brought me to an NDP convention. The NDP
1. Charles Taylor is a well-known Canadian philosopher.
2. The social democratic party in Canada.
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was not interested in getting involved with anything that was too radical
sounding — the NDP was quite conservative.
I said, yes, I was interested because the majority opinion in the NDP
was that foreign ownership was not a problem. If it was good for economic
growth then whatever was done with the economic growth was another
issue. The first thing I did was to distinguish between portfolio and direct
investment. The argument had been simply about foreign investment, but
we got onto this thing about the effect of the branch plant, and of the sale of
so many Canadian companies to American companies. This had a dynamic
effect because I was then asked to meet, for a whole weekend, with the
national executive of the NDP. The book Silent Surrender really came out
of that.
But then when I met Lloyd, I became interested in the plantation economy.
There was a relationship, in a sense, between Canada, as a country that
was increasingly dominated by the whole subsidiaries and branch plants of
foreign companies, and the Caribbean, which was a typical case of islands
involved in multinational mining and extractive activity in oil and bauxite.
We wrote some interesting things together. It was Lloyd who persuaded me
to publish what I had by 1968, in theNewWorld Quarterly,3 under the title of
‘Economic Dependence and Political Disintegration: The Case of Canada’.
And that began a kind of new existence. It was reprinted by Cy Gonick and
at the time it became a minor sensation in Canada, until I was approached
by Macmillan of Canada.
Then I got help, both from the NDP but particularly from Eric Keirens.
Eric was a remarkable fellow, very independent minded. He was a capitalist,
he was a former president of the Montreal stock exchange, and at McGill he
was a professor of commerce. He became a close friend and he gave me a
lot of good material for Silent Surrender because he really believed in the
independence of Canada. He did not like the Americans buying up all of
these companies, or the Canadians who were sending out everything to the
Americans. Eventually, I had a book. Silent Surrender was finished in 1969,
published in 1970. The publisher sent a copy to be evaluated by an economist
at University of Toronto, who rejected it; he said this was political and not
economics, it was ideological, it was whatever. But the publisher liked it and
so the publisher asked if I knew someone else who I could send it to, and I
said, send it to Mel Watkins. So they sent it to Mel and the rest is history.
He just loved it and wrote the introduction for it.
Meanwhile, Lloyd had been at McGill from 1966 to 1968. We got some
money from UNIDO for a project called ‘Export-propelled growth and
industrialization in the Caribbean’. He left to go back home in 1968 and in
1969 there was a possibility I could go to Trinidad to continue work with
him on the completion of this plantation economy model. Actually, CIDA
3. A Caribbean publication of the 1960s, no longer in print, but see: https://newworldjournal.
org/volume-iv-no-2/canada-economic-dependence-ald-political-disintegration/22/
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[the Canadian International Development Agency, which was going to fund
her] tried to block me, by getting UWI to say that they no longer wanted
someone working in social sciences. However, by that time, my good friend
William Demas, who had been long-time economic advisor to Dr William
[Eric William, the first prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago and author
of Capitalism and Slavery (1944)], knowing that I had wanted to come to
Trinidad and was preparing to do so, said, well, would you consider coming
to develop the data base for the next 5-year plan? So, I agreed. For that he
got support from the IMF. I finally went there in 1969 with money from the
IMF, technical assistance. The IMF didn’t have any problem with me — all
of the problems I had originated in Ottawa. I guess they went back to the
issues of Sir George Williams,4 the black writers’ conference, and a whole
lot of West Indian politics here in Montreal.
From 1969 to 1973 I was going back and forth and we really did amazing
work. We worked with a team of young graduates fromUWI and with statis-
ticians from the Central Statistical Office. We developed a very innovative
Trinidad and Tobago system of national accounts, based on what was then
the new UN system of national accounts, but modified to make it conform to
the structure of a petroleum economy. In 1973 that was terminated abruptly,
because of the political situation there.
AF: Can you elaborate on the Plantation Economy?
KPL: I think it is important because most of my work has been done with
regard to the Caribbean or with regard to world history. The Caribbean has
been so important in terms of what we call the international framework,
within which the plantation economy existed and continues to exist. There
are four aspects of the world, of the external environment, in which the
plantations were organized. To my mind, the four points continue to be very
useful for understanding the structure of international trade and investment,
and the shifting political spheres of influence.
The four aspects are: the division of the world by the Pope between Spain
and Portugal, one east, one west; the navigation acts, the lines of commu-
nication; of course, the division of labour between primary commodities
and manufactures; and finally the importance of what we call the metropoli-
tan exchange standard. The fourth in particular remains important to this
day, with the whole debate about the continuing importance of the Ameri-
can dollar as reserve currency in spite of the relative decline of the United
States.
You know, it was a dramatic way of emphasizing that what we have
in the English-speaking Caribbean — well, in all of the islands, even
in the small ones — does not approximate an economy as described in
4. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sir_George_Williams_affair
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textbooks of economics. The representative firm, as [Alfred] Marshall called
it, is not the family-owned enterprise, but the subsidiary of a foreign com-
pany with extractive activity. We had in mind the petroleum industry of
Trinidad, the bauxite of Jamaica, for example. So then, in looking at this
and the historical path, it led to the plantation, which was set up by foreign
capital with the express purpose of utilizing African labour to produce a
commodity of high value for international markets. Then we explored the
internal organizations of the plantations, the relation between planter and
merchant. That is, the relationship between the organization of the pro-
duction and the organization of the distribution, the finance, the access to
markets, etc. — what in Marxist language would be the sphere of circula-
tion, and the predominance of the sphere of circulation over the process of
production.
AF: Which is the inverse of the basic Marxist understanding of capitalist
development.
KPL: It is also the inverse of economics in general, because very much of
classical economics is about the real economy. In fact, Keynes’s principal
quarrel with what he called the classics was because they ignored money.
So they ignored the sphere of circulation.
AF: Much of modern economics continues to ignore money in that sense.
KPL: Indeed. I mean, this nonsense about the microeconomic foundations of
macroeconomics is an effort to ignore money. Of course, people have to be
confronted with the fact that, in historic terms, the great divide — between
North and South, or between West and East, or however you wish to put it
— really began with the industrial revolution in Britain and did not begin
to take off until the early 19th century. However, this was not only due to
huge spurts of growth in Europe and its offshoots, as [Angus] Maddison
calls them, being the United States, Canada, Australia. It was also due to the
negative reduction in growth in India, and particularly in China in the 19th
century, which the Chinese now regard as their great humiliation.
Moreover, the three centuries that preceded the industrial revolution were
enormously important because the really existing capitalism happened in the
relatively small nations on the Atlantic periphery of the Eurasian continent:
Spain, Portugal, France, The Netherlands and England. It did not happen in
the more ancient civilization of China, or of India, or of the whole Hellenic
Mediterranean region. It’s a big historical question. It could have, but it did
not happen in the great empires. It happened in these rather small and rather
recent nation states. This really existing capitalism from Western Europe
came together with the voyages of discovery, the conquest of the Americas.
If we consider these three centuries, 1500 to 1800, that mercantilist era was
characterized by what I call commerce and conquest, trade and war. The war
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was almost entirely maritime. Historians talk about perpetual trade and war
in the Caribbean.
What happened with the Renaissance — with the voyages of Vasco da
Gama and then Columbus — is that these European states extended their
territory to embrace all of the Americas. If Western Europe had not been
able to expand to embrace all of the Americas, they would not have been the
power that they became. An interesting example is The Netherlands. The
Dutch were so successful, they built the first great commercial empire that
went from the Baltic to the spice islands of Indonesia, and they established
Amsterdam as the premier financial centre of Europe, but with the small
population they had, they couldn’t carry it any further.
Trade and war were there in the traditions of these countries of West-
ern Europe that became the predominant metropolitan powers, from the
beginning. From the beginning, there was expansion and conquest. And
so, the relationship of trade and warfare, commerce and conquest, and
the element of centres and peripheries, were all there from the get-go
in the Western capitalist countries, before industrial capitalism. One could
talk not about two globalizations but about three, to think of the expansion
from the beginning.
It then continued with the better-known free trade imperialism, and the
empires, in the latter part of the 19th century, the conquest of Africa and
Asia, etc. As our friend Eric Hobsbawm writes, quite correctly, without the
previous mercantile colonial system, the revolution in the spinning industry
in Britain, British textiles, would not have had markets to sell their rather
poor cotton products. They could be sold only in the colonial trade, they
could not be sold otherwise. So the old mercantilist order that was dissolved
somewhat with the coming of free trade in England and in Europe had
served the purpose of providing the original markets, including India of
course, where British cotton goods were sold by the East India company,
and Britain put enormous tariffs against the importation of Indian cotton —
a well-known story.
AF: And you derived these insights from your work on the Plantation
Economy?
KPL: I think there is also something to be learnt from the structure of the
early chartered companies, in terms of what I call the symbiotic relationship
between the political authority, the monarch, and the merchant in the accu-
mulation of territory and wealth, and the way the chartered companies were
made into almost autonomous entities. The sovereign granted monopoly
rights to merchant companies to establish exclusivist relations with foreign
rulers in Asia and Africa. They were given the power to build ports and forts,
dispense justice, and so forth. I make the comparison with the multinational
corporations, which I call the new mercantilism.
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That line of thinking leads us to another important similarity, and that
is the emphasis on the importance of who controls communication. In the
work that we did on the Plantation Economy, the merchant had superior
power over the planter. The chartered companies were large and powerful
business enterprises compared with the multitude of producers whose ac-
cess to metropolitan markets they controlled. The merchant had control of
the market overseas, in the metropole, the source of much of the capital,
the actual control over the means of transportation. The producers — the
planters — were in a subsidiary position. The merchant sold the goods and
also supplied the inputs and could take his cut.
Today, with the information revolution, we are seeing enormous structures
of power accrue to those who control channels of communication. But even
before we had the phenomenon of the Amazons, the Googles, etc., in the
production chains, whichwe are very familiarwith, it was very very clear that
the control and the profit accrue principally to the platform that organizes the
chain. The producers, the capitalists as much as the workers who produce
the various inputs that are assembled, etc., are in a subordinate position
to those who are controlling this whole process. The deindustrialization
that has happened in the Western countries has created big problems but
it has not impoverished these countries in terms of GDP (for lack of a
better measure). They have gained in various kinds of fees and profits and
interest, and other kinds of incomes, and have moved towards the top of
the income distribution. We know about the unfavourable distribution. But
the control of channels of communication, what used to be the navigation
acts in the mercantilist system, is something that has carried right through
to the present: communication gives control. Information technology today
has been greeted positively, obviously with some good reason, but it has
some very big issues regarding power.
Hence, from the very origins of European hegemony, we see the pre-
dominance of metropolitan finance over production in the peripheries, in
contrast with the predominance of production over finance in the centre.
Viewed from the periphery, merchants remained central. They distributed
and sold the products of the emerging English industrial system in colonial
markets, and the sugar and other commodities of the slave plantations in
international markets. Merchants controlled the channels of international
commerce, including finance, insurance and shipping.
These aspects supported the establishment of European hegemony
throughout these centuries. The evolution of capitalism needs to be un-
derstood in light of these 300 years of mercantilist conquest and unequal
trade, which transformed the peripheries and integrated them into the pro-
duction networks of the centre in various differentiated ways before the
advent of industrial capitalism. There was no radical break between mer-
cantilism and English capitalism from the perspective of the periphery. US
capitalism also shows a similar continuity, although the major innovation of
US corporations was to merge production with distribution.
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AF: So the Plantation Economy helped you understand economic devel-
opment more generally?
KPL: Yes, but you see, the Plantation Economy was also something special,
in a sense unique to the Caribbean. Of course, plantations have been set up in
other countries. Interestingly, a colleague of mine has been doing research
on the fact that when the planters were compensated for the loss of their
slaves, at the time of emancipation, many of them, with connections within
the British empire, established plantations in South Asia, Southeast Asia,
and so forth. But those were not based on slave labour.
When we developed this idea, in the 1960s, those were very different
times, they were times of radical social political movements. We had in
Trinidad, in 1970, what was called a black power revolution, an uprising.
So the political idea that in some ways not very much has changed since the
days of the slave plantation was something that people could sense.
AF: You have argued thatmodern capitalism is returning to its mercantilist
origins and you have drawn parallels to the Plantation Economy. Can you
explain?
KPL: This is what some people have called extractive imperialism. In my
book Silent Surrender, there is a chapter called ‘From the Old Mercantilism
to theNew’. In the oldmercantilism, again, the representative firmwas a joint
stock corporation, the chartered companies; they received their monopolies
from the sovereign; there were many shareholders; they were adventurers,
etc. I saw similarities with the gigantic multinational corporations, also
similarities in the sense that the centre, the head office, is in control of a
variety of locations, and again how control over communication is so central
to the organization of both of the old chartered companies and the modern
multinational corporations.
AF: And you were writing this already in the late 1960s . . .
KPL: Yes. And it is still relevant today — more so than ever I think. I was
working on Silent Surrender, which was on the effects of the multinational
corporations on host countries in the developed world, the US–Canada re-
lationship, at the same time as I was working on plantation economies
with Lloyd Best, so I have always seen the connections. People have found
it strange that I would see any similarities between American companies
buying up Canadian industries and what is going on in the islands of the
Caribbean.
And we are now seeing a certain regression of capitalism to these mer-
cantilist origins in the capitalist heartlands in the US, the UK and even in
continental Europe. This regression is commonly referred to as ‘financial-
ization’, meaning the growing dominance of finance and commerce over
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production. This is best seen in terms of the concentration of power in multi-
national corporations, which increasingly do not directly produce anything
but, instead, organize production and distribution. Hence, production has
become increasingly subservient and subordinated to commerce through
subcontracting and outsourcing in various ways, and through proprietary
arrangements and monopsonistic structures of buyers vis-a`-vis producers.
This is a very different reality from that of industrial capitalism in its heyday
and from the descriptions of firms in typical microeconomics textbooks. It
can be seen as a certain type of degeneration of capitalism in comparison to
the age when industrial capitalism was based on innovation in production
rather than innovation in financial and proprietary arrangements, which is
why we call it a predatory form of capitalism.
However, the mercantilist origins of this predatory capitalism are best
viewed from the peripheries. This is in contrast to the common approach
that views such predatory capitalism as somehow a perversion from the
idealized classical forms of capitalism that emerged in Europe on the basis
of the primacy of productive innovation over commerce. The early mer-
cantilist origin of capitalism in the peripheries sheds light on the conti-
nuity of commerce over production, especially but not only in these pe-
ripheries, from slavery to the emergence of transnational corporations as
a form of ‘new mercantilism’ controlling commerce in the peripheries. At
both ends of the historical spectrum, the imbalance of power relations in
international trade is rooted in this imbalance of commerce over produc-
tion, whereby production in peripheries is subservient to commerce con-
trolled by mercantilist or new mercantilist corporations. It is for this reason
that Marxist models of capitalists exploiting labour are not very appropri-
ate for understanding the economic dependency and exploitation of coun-
tries that are incorporated as peripheries into the international capitalist
system.
Rather, it is quite tenable to suggest that the future of the capitalist cen-
tres can be seen in the history of the peripheries. For instance, those of us
working on the Caribbean used to think that the short view was a pecu-
liarity of the Plantation Economy, whereas now a similar short view has
become generalized to the economies of the centres, such as in the US and
the UK. This short view is the view of commerce: when prospects look
good for your export crop, you borrow and expand; when times turn bad,
you have no resources to diversify, so you stay in the same staple crop
and you borrow to try to maintain your standard of living; when borrow-
ing is no longer possible, you mortgage your land; when that is no longer
possible, you consume capital. In the days of slavery, consuming capi-
tal meant overworking and starving your slaves. In contemporary times, it
means laying off public servants and reducing public expenditures on edu-
cation and health, which is equivalent to consuming the human capital of a
population.
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AF: If I recall correctly, you have said that the first application of scientific
methods of organizing labour was on the slave plantations. Do you think
this influenced Adam Smith?
KPL: What I said is that a plantation with 3,000 slaves implied an industrial
organization that makes Adam Smith’s pin factory look miniscule in terms
of the division of labour. It was mind blowing, when I was taken in Jamaica,
somewhere not too far from Antigua Bay, to the Good Hope Plantation,
which had 3,000 slaves. I mean, how do you organize something like that?
You are going to have people who will be rebellious, run away to the hills,
and the organization and the accounting, and all the different aspects of that
operation . . . We are talking about the late 18th century, and what you had
in Britain at the time was largely artisanal industry, nothing was organized
on a big scale. Possibly on a physical scale, such as the sheep pasture, but
not in terms of labour.
What I said, which my colleague Lloyd Best did not like to hear, did not
agree with, is that I thought that the production of sugar on slave plantations
was in every sense a capitalist operation, organized with European capital,
with the exception of the labour regime, which was not wage labour but
slave labour. But the labour power embodied in these human machines was
valued, the amount of work that could be extracted from them, according to
their size and age and health, was estimated, and so on. So it seems to me to
be obvious that this preceded the more scientific management of production
in English agriculture.
Marxist definitions tend to define capitalism as private ownership of prop-
erty and wage labour. But if you look at capitalism in terms of the production
of something for the sheer purpose of selling it at a profit, then the planta-
tions have major attributes of tropical agrarian-style capitalism. They also
constituted the first major investment of capital in an overseas location for
this purpose.
In the case of the English colonies, as I have noted, there are also remark-
able similarities between these particular characteristics and the English agri-
cultural revolution and the role played by English oligarchic landed classes,
the same landed classes whose younger sons were sent to the colonies and
became part of the planter classes. The plantocracy and the English landed
oligarchy are largely the same families, the same people.
This long view highlights how the Caribbean slave plantations were, in
many respects, at the genesis of capitalism and the plantations were entirely
capitalist enterprises; the sole difference with the modern factory system lay
in the fact that the labour was unfree. Indeed, the slave trade only derived
its profitability from the profitability of the slave plantations. Sugar was the
largest single import of Britain, constituting close to one-quarter of the value
of all British imports in the 18th century. At the same time, the capitalist
agriculture that was evolving in Britain was often developed by the same
families that were involved in the Caribbean slave plantations. This synergy
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of mercantilism remains a hugely underemphasized, if not ignored, aspect
in the Eurocentric debates on the origins of capitalism in Northwest Europe,
which usually focus on internal causes such as agrarian transformations in
the English countryside rather than the more global commercial origins of
these transformations.
AF: How does this relate to a similar emphasis of production in early
development economics?
KPL: The fact that really existing capitalism happened in the relatively
small nations on the Atlantic periphery of the Eurasian continent accounts
for the fact that GDP per capita in Western Europe — in all the statistics,
the Maddison estimates — was significantly higher than in Eastern Europe,
and remains so to this day. Now, what is Western Europe? It borders the
Atlantic, it has special relationships with different areas of the world.
So, when we come to the [early] development economists and the im-
portance of people like Gerschenkron, Rosenstein Rodan, they were living
in regions of the world that were backward in relation to Western Europe.
Gerschenkron was of course Russian (born in the Ukraine) and much of his
work was done on the rise of Tsarist Russia.
AF: ‘Backward’ is not a very popular term these days . . . can you clarify?
KPL:Well, backward, absolutely, backward. Economically underdeveloped.
Economically backward. At the time of the Russian revolution in 1917, this
is a country hugely dominated by a peasantry, with some cities, with some
industrial establishments, actually mostly with foreign capital, and some
modern technology. This is part of the story of the Russian revolution and
the Soviet Communist Party, which considered itself to be a vanguard party
based on the working class, but the working class was extremely small, in
relationship to a vast peasantry, and they came into conflict, of course. The
whole history of the early decades of the Soviet revolution was really about
conflicts between the peasantry and the prevailing regime that was based on
urban and industrial regions.
Gerschenkron and others understood the problems of economic under-
development because they could understand it in terms of their own countries
in relation to Western Europe. Thinkers like Arthur Lewis came from the
colonies and so also had this perspective, but what is not so obvious and
perhaps not so well understood is the relationship within Europe, of East
Europe to the West. Europe is deeply divided in that way.
AF: Eric Reinert also gives a lot of emphasis to the Eastern European
experience and to the early development economists who came out of that
experience. Is your view somewhat different?
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KPL: It is very different. I have a real problemwith Reinert, in particular with
his book on why poor countries remain poor (Reinert, 2007). It has a very
strong bias against agriculture. Okay, understood, economic development
does proceed from agricultural to industrial civilizations, yes, but his book
is so negative with regard to agriculture, whereas in our world, if we wish
to save this planet from the way in which humanity is moving to destroy it,
it is the physical environment that we have to be concerned with, it is the
way we produce the food that we require without destroying the basis of the
whole ecosystem.
Reinert’s book tends towards a streamlined interpretation of development
economics along the dominant theme of increasing returns to scale, which
appears to be his way of dealing with industrialization. He draws exclusively
from the European continental experiences and economists such as Ragnar
Nurkse, whereas the driving force of capitalist expansion into the non-
European peripheries, and the way that capitalism shaped the rest of the
world through trade, war, commerce and conquest, originally emanated
from countries of the Atlantic seaboard such as The Netherlands, the UK
and France. Similarly, the origins of classical political economy also came
from these countries, particularly the UK. Hence, his narrow focus and
emphasis on increasing returns not only dismisses the role of agriculture
(and Adam Smith, for whom the quintessential capitalist was a farmer),
but it also dismisses the origins of the European expansion into the non-
European world, the origins of classical political economy, and the effects
of both on Latin America and other regions of the non-European periphery.
My own analysis places these themes centre stage.
Again, what I am saying is that the really existing capitalist system was
born in England and in some neighbouring states, and had within it, as far as
I am concerned, commerce and conquest, trade and war, from the beginning.
That does not play the same role in the development of the Hapsburg Empire,
or for that matter in the Tsarist Empire, or the unification of Germany. But
I think it carries over into the era of American hegemony.
Gerschenkron is the classic in terms of the development of the latecomers.
I take all of that. That is certainly part of the doctrine of the development
economists. But, in terms of the significance for developing countries that
are, by and large, more rural and agricultural, or at least were until not very
long ago, the dismissal of agriculture and the way in which Reinert sees
agriculture only as backwardness is not helpful, I think. So much of Arthur
Lewis, for instance, is an argument for the need to increase productivity
in the food-producing sector in order to raise the supply price of labour to
industry.
Then you have in Adam Smith a very strong line of argument favouring
domestic investment, particularly in farming actually, over the activities of
the big merchant adventurer companies. He called this the natural path.
Now, what did Adam Smith mean by the natural path? I think he meant
the progression from agricultural production into the processing of food, the
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processing of hides, the processing of tissue, fabric, etc., from the ground
up, so to speak, as distinct from that dismissal of agriculture. So, in a way,
the natural path would be one that would be obviously followed by the great
empires, such as China, which of course Adam Smith admired very much.
This is distinct from a kind of development that sees maybe the cities as the
source of modernization and development, and the countryside as backward.
That would be more Reinert.
AF: But as you yourself point out, the actual path of development of North
Atlantic capitalism was the unnatural path through mercantilism, not the
natural path.
KPL: Yes and no, because there was also the agricultural revolution. Re-
member, that is something missing from the stories of European bourgeois
capitalism — the fact that capitalist principles, of investment of money to
make profit, were first applied in England to agriculture, between the sheep
raising, which was an export activity, and the wheat cultivation, which was
for the domestic market. Arthur Lewis took that with him into his theory,
because he was trained in England and owed so much to his English edu-
cation, and he talked about the need to modernize and raise productivity in
agriculture. I think he learnt that, really, from the application of the English
model.
AF: But as you just noted, much of this investment in the land in England
was itself partly financed by wealth coming from the plantations.
KPL: Absolutely. The roots of the Anglo Saxon model, if you wish, differ
from China, for example, as a country which had all the other attributes
for developing capitalism, but didn’t. It differs in two ways. One was a
particularly English thing, the role played by the rural oligarchy; it was called
the improvement, or the agricultural revolution. The tenant farmers were not
peasants anymore, they were farmers, meaning they were farming for profits,
on land owned by landowners, and they were paying rents. Both of these
classes were engaged in agriculture. That is one. And the other difference
of course is what we have been saying — their expansionism, commerce
and conquest. They were facing the sea and all the expansion was maritime.
This aspect was very different from what might be the more natural path,
not depending on foreign conquest. The city states of the Mediterranean that
came before The Netherlands and England — Venice and Genoa — were
also engaged in trade and in war, but there was no agriculture. So, with the
early Italian economists that Reinert cites, it was all about the benefits of
trade and the division of labour, but not agriculture.
You see, at the centre of the Italian city-states is a city. A town, a bourgeois
town, burgers. I mean, the word bourgeois comes from burger, which means
citizen of a town with a wall around it, which is a burg. European continental
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development is so much to do with the role of the towns with regard to the
countryside. Feudalism was principally concerned with the relationship of
feudal authorities, princes, who have to contend with controlling the food
supply surrounding them. This was so different from the English story.
To my mind Celso Furtado was one of the few people who understood
that the English oligarchs, the landowners, were entrepreneurially minded,
unlike the Europeans. The French were the opposite. The French landowners
resisted and all progress was within the cities. In England in the 18th century,
it was the landed estates where the aristocracy carried on their social life.
The Jamaican great houses replicated the English country estates, which
they were familiar with because a lot of those families came from the landed
gentry of England. But that landed gentry of England was improving. I have
always found that fascinating because they talk about a bourgeoisie, but
the bourgeoisie derives from the European concept of the town people, as
distinct from the gentry and the landowners. But the English bourgeoisie
was rurally based.
AF: There is no example of modern growth based on industrialization that
followed the natural path, is there?
KPL:Well, no, because once the industrial revolution startedwhere it started,
which was in Western Europe, it then spread through Europe and then in
many ways industrialization came from imitation, from import substitution.
So it was something coming from abroad in trade, as manufactured goods,
and countries figured out they wanted to produce that themselves. On that
I think we are back to Latin American structuralists, particularly Furtado,
who points out that modernization, the modern lifestyle and industrializa-
tion, came to the commodity-exporting peripheries through consumption,
not production. It came because the classes that had more disposable income
purchased the imports, which eventually these countries undertook to pro-
duce domestically. But access to industrial civilization was not through the
imitation of production but through replacing the imports directly. So that is
already a different path.
It is also really important to remember that Adam Smith did not see the
industrial revolution himself. Even Ricardo, who wrote a generation later,
added on a famous chapter at the end of his book called ‘On machinery’.
So if machinery is just a final note you put on there, you are obviously not
talking about industrial capitalism, in which the machine plays a critical
role.
AF: If I dare to paraphrase, we might say that while mercantilism was an
‘unnatural path’, it nonetheless supported capitalist development in the
metropole, whereas it undermined such development in the peripheries.
This is an argument that falls clearly into the dependency tradition. Do
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you locate your arguments within this tradition? Or do you prefer to stay
away from such labels?
KPL:Well, first of all, I think that this designation of dependency is actually a
metropolitan term, along with world systems, which has been superimposed
on a lot of other work. I guess the brief answer to your question would be
yes, but I don’t think labelling is particularly helpful.
I think what is helpful — and what I think is a definition of development
— is the recognition that there are economies that have been shaped by
the domination of metropolitan structures of power. And they are not under-
developed. I do not believe in some sort of natural stages of progression, that
they are underdeveloped because they are agricultural, but rather that these
structures — social, economic and political structures — have been created
not by following a natural path, to use that idea, but by their encounter with
the dominant powers of the metropolitan. I still think that Celso Furtado
explains this the best.
Now the emphasis that some people make, say Andre Gunder Frank, or
[Arghiri] Emmanuel, that there is an unequal exchange, is so obvious that it is
not even interesting. What is really at issue is the way these economies have
been shaped by the historical reality. And that is very different in different
parts of the world. I always say that the language of centre and periphery
comes from Prebisch and Latin America. The phenomenon is particularly
clear in the case of the Americas.
As Lloyd Best and I described it, there were three different kinds of
colonization. There were colonies of conquest, principally those of Latin
America, where they got the gold and the silver. Silver was enormously
important. It demonstrated that Europe did not have the quality of industrial
goods that were made in China and in the East. Europeans did not have
commodities to balance what they wanted from the East — the trade of
spices, of porcelain, of silk, etc. — so they had to be balanced by silver. The
silver assisted enormously in that trade.
Then there were colonies of settlement, which between them largely de-
stroyed the indigenous populations, marginalized them, enslaved them, dis-
possessed them. And then there were what we call the colonies of exploita-
tion, sheer exploitation, the plantation economies. These brought African
slave labour to achieve what was really the first large-scale production of
trade goods, organized by the Europeans in Brazil, in the Caribbean, and then
in the southern United States, to produce sugar, cotton, tobacco, whatever.
In all of the Americas, the states that have arisen, that were created, all
speak a European language, all have some variant or another of a Christian
religion, many of them are settled, in both the North and the South Americas,
by Europeans. Because of the richness and resources of the Americas, they
were destined to become industrial sources of food and raw materials, and
later minerals. So they were peripheries, but peripheries in the purer sense of
the term as commodity-supplying regions. Africa was also involved in that.
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The extension of Europe eastwards — the trading companies from the
Levant to the Indian ocean, to India, and the China Seas and the Spice Islands
— was initially of lesser importance and also of lesser value than the kind
of primitive accumulation or transfer of resources that was organized from
the Americas. It was also fundamentally different given that it was based on
exploration and trade. In the early mercantilist period, wherever Europeans
traded in the East, they were just one more trader among many others.
They did not uproot the social structure of the villages in the countryside
in this earlier period. Even later, their colonies in Asia were not colonies
of settlement. As a result, the elites in these eastern peripheries were not of
European origin because there was little or no European settlement. In most
ofAsia, Christianitywas not or could not be imposed on any significant scale,
in contrast to Latin America where Christianization became all-pervasive,
even among indigenous peoples. In this sense, the western regions were truly
peripheries, in the classic understanding of the word, whereas the eastern
regions were much less so.
AF: But for you, the fundamental expression of structuralism is how these
countries encounter the dominant structures of power. So, couldn’t you
apply that to, say, Southeast Asia, where the encounter with the dominant
power had an impact on the structure of the economy and society?
KPL: Of course you can, but you also have to take into account the previous
civilizations and societies that were in Southeast Asia, and it was those that
fed the independence movements there. I mean, there was a big struggle.
When I was a student in England, I knew young students fromMalaysia who
went back and were fighting the British in the jungle. But they were fighting
the British in the jungle to reclaim what they considered to be their country.
That is a different story from Latin America.
You had huge famines in India and China. That was British imperialism,
but it was superimposed on an existing society. You see, we did not have
that in the Americas; the existing societies were destroyed. They were not
incorporated, they were really eliminated.
This basic difference between the western and eastern regions of the
periphery is profound. It arguably carries right through to the present and
is a crucial determining factor in the differential developments of these two
broadly defined peripheral regions of global capitalism. It highlights what
has become known as the two great divergences, which we started to notice
only after the 1970s. One divergence has been between North and South,
while the other has been between the industrializing eastern and the primary-
commodity export-dependent western parts of the periphery. Notably, the
latter—Latin America, the Caribbean andAfrica— all underwent structural
adjustment programmes in the 1980s. From the short perspective of an
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otherwise long lifetime, it is interesting to note that there was no clue of
these divergences in 1950.
AF: How do you position these ideas with those of World Systems theory,
such as the work of Immanuel Wallerstein?
KPL: Wallerstein has been a successful and useful academic entrepreneur,
who has turned out very little work of any originality, but has that capacity
for seeing what others have done and marketing it with words like this,
‘world systems’. I think the greatest of the scholars, on whose work he has
drawn, is [Giovanni] Arrighi. In Arrighi’s work, you can really see the path
he has taken, from being a leftist Trotskyist, Maoist Italian leftist, to the first
book, The Geometry of Imperialism (Arrighi, 1983), to the rest.
Gunder Frank (the early Gunder Frank) really saw this world system as
beginning with the voyages of Columbus. But Gunder Frank again was very
different: he was the opposite of the successful entrepreneur. He was, I think,
quite a genius, who had a lot of problems of organizing his life and of dealing
with depression, for instance, but he had the insight to say: ‘Whoa! Hold
on! The Third World did not begin in Latin America. You really need to
go back a few thousand years’. That is the ReOrient book (Frank, 1998). I
find it a very courageous book. Gunder Frank established his reputation on
the concept of the development of underdevelopment, and then in ReOrient
he basically dismissed all the greats — Marx, Polanyi, Braudel, even his
younger self — as Eurocentric. Interestingly, the only one who escaped this
dismissal was Adam Smith.
As for Immanuel Wallerstein, I have known him for a long time. He first
came to our attention in a newsletter that he circulated. In those days it was
a way of drawing attention to yourself. It is perfectly legitimate. Nowadays
we would call it a blog, but in those days it was a newsletter, and among the
persons who received it was my father [Karl Polanyi]. My father was living
in Canada already andWallerstein tried very hard to make himself known to
Karl Polanyi, who really was not terribly interested, except that Wallerstein
was very close friends with Terence Hopkins. Terry Hopkins was a student
of my father, and my father loved him, I mean, he loved all his students.
Then I knew Wallerstein when he was here at McGill teaching sociology
in the late 1960s, but his creation of this World Systems theory came later.
It is a powerful idea on which he has built his career. When he presented it
at the first Karl Polanyi conference [Hungary 1986], people thought he got
this from Polanyi. Other people thought he had gotten it from the work of
Lloyd Best and myself, you know, the four characteristics that I was telling
you about, because Terry Hopkins would share our working drafts with him.
His book also has a massive amount of copying of quotations of Braudel.
There is nothing original. You see, Wallerstein invented ‘world systems’,
the concept. He has been a very successful and systematic entrepreneur in
organizing this concept.
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AF: It is interesting that Wallerstein has become one of the central lineage
references of the post-development and decoloniality scholarship.
KPL: What does this mean, this coloniality? I don’t know what they are
talking about. I mean, Canada has many traces of its colonial origins, that is
a fact, but is that coloniality? Or does it mean that the relations that Canada
has developed with indigenous people are of a colonial kind?
AF: The arguments are also often related to a critique of a Eurocentric
vision of development as industrialization and so on.
KPL: Well, industrialization, we have to defend that. Industrialization was
key. As Deepak Nayyar wrote (Nayyar, 2013), it was catch-up. It was the
idea that if we are going to be independent, we must be as good as or better
than those old colonial powers. People who then criticize industrialization
because it is dirty, because it uses carbon fuels, for whatever reason — I
think one has to resist those arguments.
AF: These views have also tended to encourage a sort of anti-statism,
feeding into the neoliberal critique of the state.
KPL: This is where the anti-statism from the left and the right meet. The
whole attack on the idea of government as innately corrupt is where left
meets right. It is a big problem for the left, because it is very appealing. This
is the point I have been making: the hostility to the state is a commonality
between left-wing anarchism and libertarian liberalism. And that, I think, is
really a problem because I insist that we cannot dismiss the importance of
the modern state.
Also, people keep talking to me about civil society, but I say why do we
need this idea of civil society?What is wrong with society? The origin of this
notion of civil society goes back to the Cold War, to critiques of the Soviet
Union on the basis of the authoritarian nature of the state and the support
given by the Western powers to anyone agitating against the state, and they
call that civil society. And then with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
term was taken over to label all of these bottom-up things as civil society.
To my mind, this is a very confusing concept. And it is very compatible with
neoliberalism. That’s a big problem.
AF: Human rights have also been co-opted in a similar manner.
KPL: This is also unfortunate, because if you remember the words of the
famous ‘Internationale’ in German [Kari starts singing in German, until she
gets to menschenrechte] — that’s human rights. These were revolutionary
concepts, of human rights, menschenrechte. Funnily enough, the English
translation gets away from this. The English translation of the chorus of
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the ‘Internationale’ is ‘the human race’. But the German is menschenrechte,
which is human rights. It is very interesting.
With the right to development, for instance, it is only the state that can
realize the right to development of the individuals that compose the society.
That actually is the case with all of the social and economic rights. They
are rights of individuals, but only individuals who are in a society that has
a state that can move to realize those rights. The right to development is
similar.
AF: Can you elaborate on the right to development? You have written
about this.
KPL:Well, the right to development was the last gasp of the United Nations,
in terms of their very important role in assisting developing countries to
undertake structural transformation towards development. It was very clear
at the end of the 1970s, and after the various United Nations initiatives
for the New International Economic Order, that the countries of Europe, the
capitalist centres, were going to dig in. There was going to be no negotiation.
The project at that time was something called the Common Fund. It was
an UNCTAD initiative, in the first development decade of the 1960s, with
Prebisch in charge, but then it came up again in the 1970s and the 1980s. The
proposal was that there should be a common fund of several billion dollars,
but it really never happened. There were some individuals associated with
the UN who wrote a very interesting mea culpa. They acknowledged that
they did not counter the thrust towards what we now call neoliberalism in the
1980s, the dismantling of policies that were supported by the UN in earlier
times.
So, in the mid-1980s there was a resolution in the UN General Assembly
on the Right to Development. I suppose it was in the spirit of the economic
and social rights that go all the way back to the original UN declaration. But
the right to development is like all human rights. It is an individual right,
but it is the kind of individual right that cannot be achieved except by col-
lective action. No individual can individually cause economic development
to happen because it is something that requires, as far as I am concerned, a
role for the state.
Later — when we come to the human development story at the end of the
1980s — it was importantly influenced by Amartya Sen. The person behind
it was Ul Haq, but he used the authority of Sen, particularly with regard to the
treatment of income— the idea that there is a diminishing utility of income.
But increasingly there was a tendency to individualize these rights. You
know, in some ways Amartya Sen contributed to the neoliberal ideology,
in terms of the interpretation of development as a human right of each and
every individual.
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AF: He is very clearly and unabashedly a liberal theorist.
KPL: And we then come to the human rights agenda. Now, human rights
— I mean, who can quarrel with human rights? You can’t. But on the
other hand, global human rights is a complement to the neoliberal ideol-
ogy. It is very effective in justifying the various policies of neoliberalism.
Moreover, by eliminating the nation, by removing the nation from the vo-
cabulary, by removing the word international and substituting this word
global, you put the nation out of sight, out of mind, and you are substituting
a global view, and global human rights, for what used to be international
solidarity. International solidarity is the recognition of solidarity between
peoples in different nations and contexts, fighting for whatever. That has
been, I think, appropriated by the change of language to global. We talk
about the global economy but I question just what this global economy
is. I don’t say it doesn’t exist, but it is not a global version of a national
economy.
I also read it in what my father was writing about the 19th century world
market. He said really there was no such thing as the world market. For any
one nation, the world market is the markets in all the other countries. Each
of them is under the jurisdiction of a national government and each of them,
at that time, had a national currency. The only way that becomes a world
market is by tying the value of these currencies, for instance by making
them equivalent to a certain amount of gold. That then creates what can
be considered a world market. But each of these currencies is nevertheless
based within nation states, where the laws and whatever goes on there are
according to the institutions of that nation.
I think that what we have seen with globalization is the creation of truly
global power structures, but they are private. They are either multinational
corporations, where the corporation is organized as an entity that operates
in very many different parts of the world, but it has a centre. Or you have
financial funds or whatever that are directed in a certain way, buy and sell
all over the place. But these are not equivalent to a national economy which
operates within national institutions and a national political framework.
There is no global framework, there are no global institutions that replicate
on a big scale what goes on within a nation.
AF: So what do you think of the argument that we need to shift our
terminology from international to global development?
KPL: I absolutely object. I object to every elimination of the word national
or international. This word global has been co-opted to substitute for inter-
national — international — solidarity. International has been wiped out by
this word global. As I have said before, language matters. When you have
global, what disappears is the nation. International disappears, and now we
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are supposed to have global human rights, this global economy, this global
civil society. It doesn’t exist, actually.
We should really just talk about the trajectory and evolution of capitalism.
That is why I appreciate Furtado so much, because he was so strong on the
importance of the nation: the importance of national development, the im-
portance of self-reliance, of strengthening domestic savings and investment,
of strengthening internal links, and basically of controlling and limiting
the international, the involvement in the whole export model, we know the
story.
AF: Was there a ‘golden age’ of capitalism?
KPL: It was a golden age really only in Europe and the well-to-do coun-
tries. Particularly in Western Europe, these 30 so-called golden years were
probably the best that capitalism could offer, given the fact that you had
very strong socialist parties and a strong socialist tradition in Europe, and
the capitalist business, which was profitable in that period of 30 years, was
underpinned by a very powerful system of social security. But on the whole,
these 30 golden years were also very advantageous for development. The
role for the state that really comes through so clearly in Keynes was also an
advantage, for supporting developmentalism.
The BrettonWoods era was also advantageous— although I think that we
tend to look back and glorify the BrettonWoods arrangements and ascribe to
them benefits which should really be attributed to the capacity of the United
States to have so generously financed a lot of things in that period. The
Marshall Plan was the obvious example, and similar kinds of expenditures
that assisted in the recovery of Japan. The US was very powerful. This was
the glorious period of US hegemony; it has been ascribed to the Bretton
Woods financial order, but behind that order was the presence of the US
as a world power that was in a strong enough position to extend external
finance.
AF: To South Korea and Taiwan as well.
KPL: Yes, very much so — something it is no longer able to do. The
US has become a massive debtor country. But those 30 years — what the
United Nations calls the golden years of capitalism—were really the prime
of the hegemony of the United States. Think of the way in which they
folded Europe into their security concerns, the way in which, particularly in
Germany of course, they extended, if you wish, the market. The Marshall
Plan was remarkable, something like 2 per cent of GDP. Compared to
so-called foreign aid now, which is very much less than 1 per cent of
anyone’s GDP, apart perhaps from the Scandinavian countries . . . I think
the whole importance of overseas development assistance is enormously
diminished.
24 Andrew M. Fischer
AF: One of the criticisms of developmentalism in the 1960s and 1970s was
that it became associated with authoritarian governments, corruption and
so on.
KPL: Whether we are looking at the early industrial revolution in England
or at catch-up industrialization — Bismarck’s Germany, Tsarist Russia at
the end of the 19th century, as Gerschenkron has described, Japan of course,
which became an authoritarian imperialist power, the Soviet Union — in
every one of these cases, industrialization, the catch-up to modern technol-
ogy, was characterized by a political regime that was authoritarian. That
includes England — certainly the masses of people had no vote at that time.
You really cannot call that a democracy. So, that process of achieving a very
high rate of savings, of suppressing consumption, of transformation from an
agricultural into a modern industrial society, is really a very difficult one.
The one exception was the United States, on account of the vastness of the
land settled— land stolen from the indigenous populations that were largely
destroyed and certainly marginalized.
So, the association of capitalism with democracy is a very questionable
one, particularly in the ascent, in the catch-up period, in the difficult periods
of high rates of savings, suppressed consumption, andmovements of peoples.
I would say that one has to look at the historical process and where it has
happened. Similarly in the four little tigers [South Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Singapore], they call themselves democracies now, but they were
not democracies. You have China, it is a one-party state. Thank god for that.
I could not imagine the dangers and chaos that would ensue if they introduce
party politics in China. Really, I think the world would not be safe.
AF: Some scholars, such as Thandika Mkandawire, argue for democratic
developmental states.
KPL: Yes, I would argue for that too, because of technological progress. So
much of what we used to find difficult to produce and therefore very valuable
is now very common, very cheap. We have benefited from the technology
that has been developed . . . Yes, I am seeing what has happened in history,
but this is not necessarily what must continue to happen.
That being said, what we are seeing now is a trend of authoritarian gov-
ernments, with popular support. We see it in Turkey, in the Philippines, in
India, in Hungary, Poland . . . These are rising powers. And these regimes,
whatever they are, they are not Western liberal democracies, that is for sure.
It is not clear how many Western liberal democracies are going to survive
anywhere. It is hard not to recognize the rise of authoritarian regimes— and
they are not on the left.
AF: Many argue, even often from the left, that globalization has reduced
the effectiveness of nation states and made them powerless to do the types
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of things they used to be able to do in terms of regulating capital, taxation,
and so on, because it is so easy for corporations to bypass governments.
KPL: That is a very real phenomenon. The reduction of the capacities of
nation states to govern is a reality. It is very well illustrated by the way that
corporations escape taxation. But the critique or the comments usually claim
that this is not only a reality, but also desirable, in the sense that national
boundaries are passe´, irrelevant, and an efficient modern organization re-
quires global governance, an international financial order. I don’t know. As
far as I am concerned, this is not anything that is within sight. If it were within
sight, it would be extremely repressive and authoritarian, because I believe
the further you move away from where people can influence in some way
the outcome, the political outcome, the further you move from any form of
democracy, toward a totalitarian authoritarian control. So the supranational
organizations that we have— the Bank of International Settlements, the G7,
or whatever— those are centres of political decision making that are furthest
removed from popular influence of any kind.
AF: Given the nature of very powerful multinational corporations that
wield so much power and wealth in the global economy, don’t we need
forms of international governance that can regulate them? That’s the
argument for the European Union. If you do not have a regional level of
government that is able to regulate . . .
KPL: You see, the European Union is a very good example of what can
happen, what has happened. A union is preferable, it can achieve many good
things, such as the movement of people, which has been the greatest single
achievement. But it is precisely where the union is strong, which is acting in
the common interest of all of the banks, that has impacted most negatively on
the policy space and, if you wish, the democratic process of the constituent
nations. What has been constructed in the European Union, what comes out
of Brussels, represents the interests of finance and banks.
AF: But still, how do democratic forces negotiate with and attempt to
regulate these very powerful transnational economic organizations, inter-
national banks, large corporations, large global mining companies that
have thousands of subsidiaries and armies of accountants and lawyers
working for them?
KPL: The answer of course is that I do not know. However, I would say the
danger with any kind of regulation is that these powerful organizations take
charge to self-regulate. I really believe that we have to strengthen the regional
dimensions of the world order. The individual nations are not powerful
enough — they can be taken advantage of in international regulations, so
that instead of regulating the multinationals, the multinationals write the
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rules and enforce them. The problem then is representation at the regional
level, as with the European Union. But it is more likely to be able to assert
the political leverage of the populations of the constituent nations at the
regional level than it is at the global level.
AF:Even at the national level— if you look at theUS for instance, political
power is captured by very powerful economic interests.
KPL: Yes, but whatever progress has been made in modern times toward
what might be called some form of democracy has been made at the national
level. What we had previously— and it was accepted—was a large number
of countries with very solid, nationally owned enterprises, including national
banks, banks that were not privately owned. In that sense, there has been a
huge regression in the last 40 years, in the neoliberal counter-revolution that
rolled back so much of the public control over investment and capital.
AF: Are you pessimistic about the future?
KPL: I guess we have to come back to that old quote by Gramsci, pessimism
of the intellect, optimism of the will. I do not know any other way to live
except to see some possibilities of a good future, because if you were really
totally convinced that the world is going to perdition, then there is no point
in anything . . .
But I think a more meaningful question is how I see current developments,
because I really do see a crisis of liberal capitalism. I see capitalism as an
economic and social order having reached a stage that I describe as financial-
ized rentier capital, which is no longer able to sustain the kind of social and
political order that we have had and that has served us well. It is no longer
able to sustain a certain level of societal coherence— let’s call it democratic
representational government and all of these things. These systems seem to
have deteriorated to the point where 70 per cent of Americans don’t believe
in either political party; young people increasingly do not believe in politics
of the representational liberal variety; and we are seeing the rise of author-
itarian governments that have popular support. Let’s face it, whether it is
Erdogan in Turkey, or Putin in Russia, there is support.
AF: Just to be provocative, since I’ve known you, you have always seen the
system as on the verge of crisis [Kari laughs], and wisely so, but one of the
things that is so striking over the last 30 or more years is the resilience of
the neoliberal capitalist system. Even though analytically, intellectually,
we see it converging towards crisis, it somehow manages to sustain itself.
It is resilient.
KPL: I would argue that the demise of the Soviet Union in 1990 put newwind
into the neoliberal sails — the TINA effect — ‘there is no alternative’. Since
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that time, it has sustained itself by progressive financialization, by creating
structures of debt that have served to balloon and sustain real progress,
yes, and increasingly the creation of rents. That is, the extension of private
ownership into areas of knowledge which really are social, which should
not be private, and the creation of scarcities and rents which yield income,
but only for those who own. We have seen the progressive deterioration
of income distribution, internally, within almost all countries. The increase
in internal differentiation is, I think, universal, even if at a global scale
there might have been a reduction in inequality because so many people
have been raised from abject poverty, particularly but not exclusively in
China.
As I keep saying, we still live in nations, we live in countries, the only
governments we have are national, by and large. We might move from one
place to another, but we still do so in the framework of national societies,
and they have all become more unequal, and therefore they have all become
more contentious in some ways.
AF: Do you see this as a dangerous development?
KPL: I don’t think the world has been as dangerously disordered as it is now,
since the outbreak of World War I, although we did not know it at the time.
AF: And in your mind this is due to neoliberalism?
KPL: Together with the neoliberalist ideology of human rights. But the
human rights that are singled out as the most important to theWest are rights
(or so-called rights, or apparent rights, or claimed-to-be rights) which are
basically not acceptable to the majority of people in this world. Like gay
marriage, which is really contrary to prevailing belief systems in very many
different societies in this world, including our own. But the fact is that the
West — particularly the Americans, I must say — have championed some
of these liberal causes at a time when people have reason to be fearful of
what is going on in the world. They are fearful because of wars, because
of the displacement of people — and it is not only the refugees who are
displaced, and who have cause to be fearful, but also people in the countries
into which these refugees have been pouring in large numbers, who are
fearful of receiving them — and because of this perpetual ‘war on terror’
that the West has created and that makes people fearful. I don’t even know
what it is that they are fearful about, but it gives people the wish to find some
strong personality or government that will protect them from these perceived
dangers. It seems to me to be kind of obvious. Also, of course, those who are
more comfortable with this liberal discourse are the privileged of our society.
So that leaves others in the society who are the disadvantaged, who know
that they are or feel that they are, whether it is the result of disappearing
employment or disappearing community.
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AF: Isn’t that a common explanation for the rise of Trump in terms of
locating it in the support of working classes and those disenfranchised by
globalization?A lot of studies have in fact shown that that is not necessarily
the case: it might have been a marginal factor, but there are also a lot of
strong and powerful interests behind people like Trump.
KPL: Yes, but what Trump can do is to use the democratic system to get
people behind him and build a popular movement, to capture the leadership
over people who are going to validate him and his crowd in political terms.
The fact that Trump and those around him are there to make themselves
richer than before — and many of them are already very rich — is neither
here nor there. It is the fact that he has the ability to capture the discontent, to
express it. But what is new about that? That is the fascist appeal: it happened
in the 1930s too.
AF: So, are you worried about the return of fascism?
KPL: Well, that depends on what you mean by fascism, really. My under-
standing of fascism comes from Europe of the 1930s, because that is where
the word came from. The word fascism first came from Italy, from Mus-
solini’s version of national socialism. Hitler’s movement was also called
national socialism — that is how we got the word Nazi. The initial adver-
saries were the socialists, who made class the basis of their solidarity. The
fascist movement, which was a corporatist one, was to replace the solidarity
of the working class by some form of solidarity of nation, of nationalism —
hence the term national socialism. That nationalism, particularly evident in
Germany, was strengthened by having adversaries, which is where it found
the racialism. So that the German nation is superior to other Europeans, who
are lesser breeds.
To my mind, fascism is opposed to socialism, but neither socialism
nor fascism are individualistic liberal capitalism. Democracy is a relative
of individualistic capital. I look at it in the Austrian way: in the 1930s,
there was a fear on the part of the Austrian ruling classes about the per-
ceived dangers of socialist parties, socialist militias, socialism. There was
an effort to generate militias — called Heimwehr in Austria; in Germany
they were called something else — in order to arm themselves with some
power. But their aim was to maintain the basic structure of the system, to
maintain the ruling classes, to continue to be the ruling classes. That was
fascism.
There was also a racial element which singled out the Jews, especially. I
think this was particularly European, where Jews played a particular kind of
role in the societies where they became scapegoats. But I do not see fascism
as necessarily identified with anti-Semitism. Rather, it is a strategy of the
ruling classes — including what were the industrial ruling classes of that
time, as well as the other traditional ruling classes, the landed aristocracy
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— to maintain power by offering people a solidarity of nation rather than a
solidarity of class. That is how I understand it in the 1930s.
So, it is interesting if you look at Trump in those terms, or even Brexit
for that matter, or Italy . . . Definitely there is an appeal to solidarity and
togetherness, whether it is more of nation or of people, and it plays to the
sentiment of heimat in German, patrie in French. I don’t know what you
call it in English. Maybe we do not have a word for it in the Anglosphere.
Patriotism comes from the French. Fatherland already sounds fascist, it
sounds German. Heimat is a very lovely phrase. It translates into homeland.
We think of that as being some kind of nasty militia homeland, but homeland
in German means country. It is an appealing word.
Fascism was not necessarily expansionist either. The issues with Franco
were not external to Spain, they really were about the overthrow of the
Republic because the Republic was feared to be socialistic. In the case of
Mussolini, certainly Italians felt that they were entitled to some colonies
too — ‘look at the British, the French and the Belgians, we want some
too, we are going to go to Abyssinia’ — but I do not think it was a major
element, because you did not have it with Franco. You did not have it with the
Austrian fascists. They were not expansionist. If anything they were fearful
of the Germans, and the upper classes were divided about whether to make
a kind of local version of right-wing fascism, with the heimat and so on, or
whether to go with the Nazis. Austrian patriotism worked for them in a sense
of nationalism against the Germans. ‘After all, we were the Great Hapsburg
Empire, who are these Teutonic come-lately god-damned Germans? They
are not civilized, they have not been here for very long, compared to the
grandeur of the Hapsburg Empire, blah blah blah . . . ’. But they were not
expansionist, more defensive.
I think things like ‘Make America Great Again’ are typically fascist, kind
of national. But behind fascists are the old ruling classes. I think that is a
characteristic of fascism. On the other hand, there is also a deep cleavage
within the ruling classes and the elites in theUS today, between the neoliberal
supporters of globalization and these more nationalistic elites.
AF: What role has neoliberalism — understood as a counter-revolution
that has bolstered the power of capital over labour — played in this?
KPL: I think there are two kinds of roots that we need to look at with regard
to neoliberalism. One of them is in terms of the creation of the ideology.
The difference between neoliberalism and classical liberalism — the John
Stuart Mill kind of liberalism — was the circumstances that gave rise to
the former, which seem to have been the death of liberalism, compared to
the Soviet Union, the New Deal, etc. But the point of Hayek and company
was not to diminish the role of the state. The point was to change it and
in a sense to use the state, and the regulations and the rules that govern
society, to ensure the rights of property. So it was quite a strong state in
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many ways, but it was a strong state for the purpose of protecting property
from the rabble, in other words, from the functioning of democratic rules
and regulations. That is the ideology and it is important. When Hayek got
his Nobel Prize in 1974, it was a legitimation of the creed, even though the
prize had to be shared with Myrdal. And [Milton] Friedman got one shortly
after.
The other root is the one of policy, which is equally important. Because
when they say that there was a counter-revolution in the 1970s, I believe that
counter-revolution was predicted in a sense by Kalecki, in the lecture that he
delivered to theMarshall society in 1942. I was there and I heard him lecture.
What he was saying with his Marxist-type building blocks, with department
one and department two instead of consumption goods and investment goods,
was that in conditions of full employment the position of workers would be
strengthened. And although it might be profitable for the capitalists — they
continue to make profits under this kind of system of shared productivity —
they would lose their relative power. Kalecki suggested that they would not
be content to lose relative power.
I think that is exactly what was happening. They were losing power, they
were being challenged in various ways. When you put that together with
foreign affairs — the movement against the war in Vietnam, revolutions of
various kinds from Afghanistan to Nicaragua, Iran, the hostage crisis (very
humiliating to the Carter regime) — there was a sense of ungovernability.
There was talk about whether democracy is ungovernable. Then you had the
Trilateral Commission of Japan, Europe and America in 1973, and the first
convening of what became the G7 in 1975. It was the first time that the major
capitalist powers had created a group expressing concern with the increasing
disorder in the world, both domestically with stagflation and internationally
with these apparent gains in the New International Economic Order, OPEC
and the oil crisis, and all of that, a combination of circumstances. It was
really a class position and it played itself out in terms of the governing
classes making the case that a change of direction was needed, a regime
change as somebody called it, towards what we then came to know as the
neoliberal regime. So I think these go in parallel — what happens in reality
and what is constructed as an ideology.
AF: Any last words?
KPL: I think there are a number of people who have proven their perceptions
to beworth listening to, who have beenwarning us about wherewe are taking
the world with technology. These include my father, but also many others,
such as Albert Einstein. I like to cite Einstein, who said that we must be
certain that the creations of our mind shall be of benefit and not a curse to
mankind. And among the creations of our mind are our scientific attitude,
our belief in science and technology. Economics is also a creation of our
mind and I think it is one that should be questioned.
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